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INTRODUCTION
or over a quarter of a century, tense ceasefire, punctuated
by bloody violence,
1
has entrenched South Caucasus neigh-
bors Armenia
2
and Azerbaijan
3
in a “frozen conflict” over Na-
gorno-Karabakh.
4
Armenia’s occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh
5
1. Nagorno-Karabakh Profile, BBC (Apr. 6, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18270325 (describing the recent vio-
lence in Nagorno-Karabakh as beginning “[i]n 1988, towards the end of Soviet
rule,” when Azerbaijan and Armenia started “a bloody war which left the de
facto independent state in the hands of ethnic Armenians when a truce was
signed in 1994. . . . Both sides have had soldiers killed in sporadic breaches of
the ceasefire.”).
2. The World Factbook: Armenia, C.I.A. (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-
factbook/geos/am.html.
3. The World Factbook: Azerbaijan, C.I.A. (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/aj.html.
4. Emily Tamkin, Azerbaijan’s President Calls for Renewed Nagorno-
Karabakh Talks. It’s Not That Simple., FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 15, 2017),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/15/azerbaijans-president-calls-for-renewed-
nagorno-karabakh-talks-its-not-that-simple/ (defining a frozen conflict as “one
in which both sides are at a tense but calm standstill.” However, Nagorno
Karabakh’s Ombudsman for Human Rights stated that the conflict is “¶not fro-
zen,’ . . . [noting that] in the past 10 months . . . 20 soldiers from the Nagorno
Karabakh side were killed, and 95 were wounded. He said he knew that the
Azeri side suffered losses, as well.”); Alan Hope, United Nations at Crossroads,
TREND NEWS AGENCY (Sept. 19, 2017),
https://en.trend.az/world/other/2798457.html (disparaging the U.N. as “an
overstaffed well-oiled bureaucratic machine” unable to resolve the “frozen con-
flicts in Nagorno Karabakh”);What Were US Legislators Doing Paying an Ille-
gal Visit to Nagorno-Karabakh? ³ Eurasia Crossroads, TREND NEWS AGENCY
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/2837801.html (“Nagorno-
Karabakh is the breakaway province of Azerbaijan which has been stuck in
limbo ³ a so-called frozen conflict ³ since just after the collapse of the Soviet
Union.”); cf. LAURENCE BROERS, THE NAGORNY KARABAKH CONFLICT:
DEFAULTING TO WAR 3 (Chatham House 2016), available at
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/nagorny-karabakh-conflict-de-
faulting-war (“[I]noculated by the language of ¶frozen conflict’, regional and
global powers have overlooked a dispute that could embroil them all in a major
new war.”); but see Karabakh Conflict Is Not Frozen, French Ambassador Says,
ARKA NEWS AGENCY (Dec. 12, 2017), http://arka.am/en/news/poli-
tics/karabakh_conflict_is_not_frozen_french_ambassador_says/ (quoting Jona-
than Lacôte, French Ambassador to Armenia, as finding it “hard to include the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict among the ¶frozen’ conflicts” because of the reflec-
tion of the conflict among the public and the continuing fighting, “add[ing] that
57 soldiers have died at the line of contact since the beginning of 2017.”).
F
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is far from successful,
6
and the destructive disorder in the con-
tested region stands in disturbing juxtaposition with the inter-
national law of occupation, which is “primarily motivated by hu-
manitarian considerations.”
7
According to Article 42 of the 1907
Hague Regulations, a “territory is considered occupied when it
is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The
occupation extends only to the territory where such authority
has been established and can be exercised.”
8
The international
law of occupation still applies in situations of partial territorial
occupation, and even if the occupier “meets with no armed re-
sistance.”
9
Under the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (“Fourth
Geneva Convention”) and its Additional Protocol I, an occupier
5. Eugene Kontorovich, Symposium on Occupation Law: The Necessary
Non-Normativity and Temporal Indeterminacy of Occupation Law, OPINIO
JURIS (Aug. 30, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/08/30/the-necessary-non-nor-
mativity-and-temporal-indeterminacy-of-occupation-law/ (“International law .
. . regards Armenian control [of Nagorno-Karabakh] as an occupation. . . .”); see
also NONA MIKHELIDZE & NICOLETTA PIROZZI, CIVIL SOCIETY AND CONFLICT
TRANSFORMATION IN ABKHAZIA, ISRAEL/PALESTINE, NAGORNO-KARABAKH,
TRANSNISTRIA AND WESTERN SAHARA, MICROCON 16 (2008), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1307808 (“The long lasting ethno-political conflict
between Azerbaijan and Armenia . . . resulted in the Armenian occupation of
about 20% of Azerbaijan’s territory, including Nagorno-Karabakh and seven
adjacent districts. . . .”).
6. David M. Edelstein, Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations
Succeed or Fail, 29 INT’L SECURITY 49, 49²51 (2004), https://muse.jhu.edu/arti-
cle/171547 (arguing that a successful occupation “secure[s] the interests of the
occupying power and prevent[s] the occupied territory from becoming a source
of instability,” while recognizing that “[d]espite relatively successful military
occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II, careful examination
indicates that unusual geopolitical circumstances were the keys to success in
those two cases, and historically military occupations fail more often than they
succeed.”).
7. Occupation and International Humanitarian Law: Questions and An-
swers, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Aug. 4, 2004), https://www.icrc.org/eng/re-
sources/documents/misc/634kfc.htm (emphasis added).
8. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art.
42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ap-
plic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documen-
tId=3741EAB8E36E9274C12563CD00516894 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regu-
lations].
9. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, available
at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/380 [hereinafter Geneva Conven-
tion].
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has the duty to implement humanitarian safeguards to protect
the welfare of the occupied people.
10
Unfortunately, the Nagorno-Karabakh occupation is plagued
by the question of whether the international law of occupation
even applies.
11
This uncertainty underlies a corrupt occupation
12
permitting international human rights violations in and around
10. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/additional-protocols-
1977.htm [hereinafter Protocol I].
11. Kontorovich, supra note 5 (observing, first, that the non-enforcement “of
occupation law by the international community almost entirely exempts” Na-
gorno-Karabakh from the international law of occupation, and second, that Ar-
menia views its “control as an exercise of the self-determination of the
Karabakh population”³not as an occupation³although international law re-
jects this argument); see also Thomas De Waal, Solve the Nagorno-Karabakh
Conflict Before It Explodes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/04/08/opinion/solve-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-before-it-
explodes.html (explaining that international inaction is based on a “hope
among the international community . . . that the problem can be left alone.”).
12. Corrupt occupation is the author’s term and is intended to be more of a
critique of the international law of occupation and less of the state actors. In
the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia does not view its control as an occu-
pation of the territory and its people; relying on the 1991 referendum and sub-
sequent creation of Nagorno-Karabakh’s central government, it considers the
territory to be independent, including from the sovereignty of either Armenia
and Azerbaijan. See Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, INT’L CRISISGROUP
3²5 (Oct. 11, 2005), https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/cauca-
sus/nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan/nagorno-karabakh-plan-peace. Conversely,
Azerbaijan considers Armenia to be acting illegally in its occupation of Na-
gorno-Karabakh. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly
Adopts Resolution Reaffirming Territorial Integrity of Azerbaijan, Demanding
Withdrawal of All Armenian Forces (Mar. 14, 2008),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/ga10693.doc.htm [hereinafter General As-
sembly Adopts Resolution Reaffirming Territorial Integrity of Azerbaijan]. Alt-
hough Azerbaijan recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh as occupied, it launches at-
tacks in the region, citing self-defense. Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace,
supra, at 5²6.
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Nagorno-Karabakh,
13
and escalating population resettlement
14
despite ongoing violence.
15
Consequently, the occupation stokes
the military tensions of both countries
16
³endangering civil-
ians
17
and international stability.
18
Based on these struggles, the
13. See Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, supra note 12, at 6 (“From the
very beginning, the [Nagorno-Karabakh] conflict degenerated into violence and
ethnic cleansing . . . [and] [n]either country has shown any willingness to ad-
dress the human rights violations that occurred . . . .”); id. at 7 (citing that
“Armenia not only forcibly displaced Azeris from Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh
and seven districts around it, but also took control of 11,722 square kilometres
of Azerbaijan” in contravention of Azeris’ basic human rights, such as freedom
of movement) (citations omitted); see also Chiragov v. Armenia, 2015-III Eur.
Ct. H.R. 135 (2015) (finding Armenia in violation of complainant Azerbaijani
refugees’ Articles 1, 8 and 13 rights under the European Convention on Human
Rights based in part on their inability to return to their homes since the Na-
gorno-Karabakh conflict began); see also Press Country Profile ³ Armenia,
EUR. CT. H.R. (July 2017), http://www.echr.coe.int/Docu-
ments/CP_Armenia_ENG.pdf (“There are currently more than one thousand
individual applications pending before the [European] Court [of Human
Rights] which were lodged by persons displaced during the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict.”).
14. Rupen Janbazian, Building a Border Village in Artsakh: Arajamugh Vil-
lage Expansion Project Makes Headway, ARMENIAN WKLY. (Aug. 11, 2017),
https://armenianweekly.com/2017/08/11/arajamugh-village-expansion-project-
makes-headway/; see THOMAS DE WAAL, BLACK GARDEN: ARMENIA AND
AZERBAIJAN THROUGH PEACE AND WAR 49 (2013); see also General Assembly
Adopts Resolution Reaffirming Territorial Integrity of Azerbaijan, supra note
12 (describing Azerbaijan’s representative’s accusations against Armenia of at-
tempting “to consolidate the occupation through illegal activities . . . . [includ-
ing] an outrageous policy of massive illegal settlement of Armenians in the
occupied territories.”).
15. Karabakh Conflict Is Not Frozen, French Ambassador Says, supra note
4; see also Chiragov, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 218²19 (finding a “continued
presence of Armenian and Armenian-backed troops, ceasefire breaches on the
Line of Contact, [and] an overall hostile relationship between Armenia and
Azerbaijan . . . .”).
16. General Assembly Adopts Resolution Reaffirming Territorial Integrity
of Azerbaijan, supra note 12; see also BROERS, supra note 4, at 3 (warning that
Nagorno-Karabakh’s current situation is one where “regional and global pow-
ers have overlooked a dispute that could embroil them all in a major new
war.”); Karabakh Conflict Is Not Frozen, French Ambassador Says, supra note
4.
17. Nagorno-Karabakh Truce Holds, but Residents Fear Renewed Violence,
REUTERS (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-nagorno-karabakh-
ceasfire/nagorno-karabakh-truce-holds-but-residents-fear-renewed-violence-
idUSKCN0X30DV.
18. See generally EVERETT PRICE ET AL., HELSINKI COMMISSION REPORT, IN
BRIEF: THENAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT (Stacy Hope ed., 2017), available at
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international law of occupation should be reformulated to clarify
occupier responsibility and to close current gaps in providing hu-
manitarian aid,
19
hopefully preventing another corrupt occupa-
tion from occurring in the future.
Part I of this Note introduces Nagorno-Karabakh and dis-
cusses the historical importance of the region to the relationship
between Azerbaijan and Armenia, noting the events that have
led up to its occupation. Part II defines occupation and discusses
the purposes of the international law of occupation. Part III an-
alyzes corrupt occupation, focusing on the law’s misuse in Na-
gorno-Karabakh. Part IV proposes a solution to mitigate some of
the negative effects of corrupt occupation in an occupied terri-
tory: adding an occupier-intent element to Article 6 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention that requires an occupier to provide compre-
hensive humanitarian protections. An analysis of the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the proposed solution follows.
Part V applies the reformulation to Nagorno-Karabakh. Alt-
hough these changes to the international law of occupation may
not resolve the political, territorial and humanitarian issues
plaguing the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region, they would
potentially encourage steps towards peace and help prevent fu-
ture corrupt occupations resulting in prolonged conflicts. Fi-
nally, this Note concludes that the international community has
an opportunity to learn from the unfortunate outcome in Na-
gorno-Karabakh and to improve the international law of occupa-
tion.
https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/Report%20-
%20Nagorno-Karabakh%20-%20Design%20FINAL_0.pdf (warning that the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict “poses a serious threat to stability in the South
Caucasus region and beyond.”); Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, supra
note 12, at i (“[T]he long running Nagorno-Karabakh conflict [is] the most sig-
nificant obstacle to stability in the South Caucasus . . . .”); De Waal, supra note
11.
19. A literal reading of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that only the
Articles referred to in Article 6³1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61
to 77, and 143³remain in force during an occupation. Geneva Convention, su-
pra note 9, art. 6.
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I. A BRIEFHISTORY OFNAGORNO-KARABAKH
Nagorno-Karabakh, which translates to “mountainous black
garden,”
20
is a landlocked region within the territorial bounda-
ries of southwestern Azerbaijan,
21
and is surrounded by a mili-
tarized buffer zone.
22
The area’s fractured geography is further
complicated by the physically separate territory of Azerbaijan,
the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, located to the south and
west of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.
23
Map of the South Caucasus
24
20. Nagorno-Karabakh Profile, supra note 1; DE WAAL, supra note 14, at 8
(explaining that the region’s name “itself suggests the fruitful crossbreeding of
cultures,” with “Karabakh” originating as a “a Turkish-Persian fusion, most
commonly translated as ¶Black Garden’” and “Nagorno” meaning “mountain-
ous” in Russian).
21. Karabakh Conflict Is Not Frozen, French Ambassador Says, supra note
4.
22. De Waal, supra note 11 (“The 1994 truce left the Armenian side in con-
trol not just of the disputed province, but also of a section of Azerbaijani terri-
tory around Nagorno-Karabakh . . . . regard[ed] as a protective buffer zone . . .
.”); see also Chiragov v. Armenia, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 219 (2015) (noting the
Armenian government’s argument that its control over the area of Lachin be-
tween Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh “was of military strategic importance
and that there was a need to deliver food, medicine and other supplies into
Nagorno-Karabakh.”).
23. Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, supra note 12, at 14, 22.
24. Current map of the South Caucasus region and its neighbors. “This map
is for reference only and should not be taken to imply political endorsement of
its content.” Id. at app. A.
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Historically, Nagorno-Karabakh was a well-known and
sought-after region.
25
While Armenia lays historical claim to the
land dating back to the ninth century BC, the territory was var-
iously controlled by the Persian, Ottoman, and Russian empires
until the end of the Russian Tsarist regime.
26
In 1918, Azerbai-
jan, with Turkey’s aid, invaded and took control of Nagorno-
Karabakh.
27
A. Soviet Rule and Subsequent Conflict
Five years later, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin
28
deemed Na-
gorno-Karabakh an autonomous district of Azerbaijan under the
authority of the United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
29
The
USSR established a regional parliament and appointed govern-
ment officials, overseen by the Soviet Republics.
30
Although the
area maintained a majority ethnic Armenian population, Azer-
baijanis coexisted in the region.
31
As the USSR dissolved in the 1980s, however, suppressed ten-
sions over conflicting claims of territorial ownership of Nagorno-
Karabakh
32
exploded between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 1988,
25. DEWAAL, supra note 14, at 8 (describing Nagorno-Karabakh’s “allure, .
. . famous for its mixed Christian-Muslim population; for the independence of
its rulers, whether Christian or Muslim; for being fought over by rival empires;
for its forests and monasteries; for producing warriors and poets; for its grapes,
mulberries, silk, and corn.”).
26. Nagorno-Karabakh Issue, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. REP. ARM.,
https://www.mfa.am/en/nagorno-karabakh-issue (last visited Dec. 27, 2017);
see also DEWAAL, supra note 14, at 8.
27. Nagorno-Karabakh Issue, supra note 26; cf. DEWAAL, supra note 14, at
126.
28. See generally ROBERT SERVICE, STALIN: A BIOGRAPHY (2006).
29. Janbazian, supra note 14.
30. SERVICE, supra note 28, at 204 (despite fierce opposition from Armenia,
Stalin decided that giving Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan would be the most
pragmatic political choice, meant to engender support for Communism in Asia
and cool military threats from Turkey, Azerbaijan’s ally).
31. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AZERBAIJAN SEVEN YEARS OF CONFLICT IN
NAGORNO-KARABAKH xx (1994), available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/de-
fault/files/reports/AZER%20Conflict%20in%20N-K%20Dec94.pdf (citing the
1989 census demographics of Nagorno-Karabakh as “approximately 75 percent
ethnic Armenian . . . and 25 percent ethnic Azeri,” with the Oblast’s capital
being “largely Armenian, while Shusha, Karabakh’s pre-Soviet center, was
comprised mostly of Azeris.”); see generally DEWAAL, supra note 14.
32. SeeDEWAAL, supra note 14, at 126²27 (clarifying that the “dispute [over
Nagorno-Karabakh] date[s] back little more than one hundred years. . . . The
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Nagorno-Karabakh’s oblast
33
parliament voted to join Arme-
nia.
34
The vote sparked widespread violence
35
between Azeri and
Armenian forces, which attempted to take control of the area.
36
The waning USSR, unwilling to risk a conflict with Azerbaijan’s
allies³particularly Turkey
37
³consistently ignored Nagorno-
Karabakh’s petitions to join Armenia.
38
In 1991, a referendum,
boycotted by the Azeri residents,
39
declared the region’s inde-
pendence.
40
Azerbaijan officially refused to recognize even “the
validity of the poll,”
41
and not a single State recognized Nagorno-
Karabakh’s subsequently proclaimed autonomy.
42
By 1992, the
conflict over the region’s independence escalated into full-scale
war.
43
The fighting killed between 20,000 to 30,000 soldiers and
roots . . . can be traced back to the period when the Ottoman and Russian Em-
pires were in their dying phases and both Armenians and Azerbaijanis discov-
ered the idea of national self-determination.”); Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for
Peace, supra note 12, at 3 (explaining that “Both [Armenia and Azerbaijan]
sustain the notion of ethnic continuity in Nagorno-Karabakh to justify their
right to sovereignty today,” a dispute that began to fester after the drawing of
the Soviet borders).
33. An oblast is “a political subdivision of Imperial Russia or a republic of
the U.S.S.R. or of the Russian Federation.” Oblast, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2018),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/oblast.
34. Nagorno-Karabakh Profile, supra note 1.
35. Although this Note focuses on the conflict within Nagorno-Karabakh,
devastating violence occurred before and as a result of the conflict outside of
the region. For an in-depth account of the genocidal acts imprinted on Armenia
and Azerbaijan, see DEWAAL, supra note 14.
36. Id.
37. SERVICE, supra note 28, at 204.
38. See DEWAAL, supra note 14, at 292.
39. See Chiragov v. Armenia, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 148²49 (2015).
40. Declaration on Proclamation of the Nagorno Karabagh Republic, OFF.
NKR PRESIDENT, http://www.president.nkr.am/en/nkr/nkr1 (last visited Sept.
6, 2017).
41. Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, supra note 12, at 4.
42. EUR. CT. H.R., EXTRA-TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF STATES PARTIES TO
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 3, n.3 (Feb. 2016),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Extra-
territorial_jurisdiction_ENG.pdf [hereinafter EXTRA-TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION OF STATES PARTIES TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS]. (“The self-proclaimed independence of the ¶NKR’ has not been recog-
nised by any State or international organisation.”); Chiragov, 2015-III Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 215 (noting that “the ¶NKR’ is not recognised by any State or interna-
tional organization.”).
43. Nagorno-Karabakh Profile, supra note 1.
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civilians, and displaced over one million people, including Azer-
baijanis fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenians fleeing Azer-
baijan.
44
B. Attempting Peace Amid Instability
The presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a Russia-
brokered ceasefire agreement in 1994,
45
leaving Nagorno-
Karabakh under de facto Armenian control.
46
That same year,
the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
(OSCE)
47
formed the Minsk Group,
48
tasked with facilitating a
peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
49
The
United States, France, and Russia, who serve as the Minsk
Group’s co-chairs,
50
do not recognize the self-proclaimed inde-
pendence of Nagorno-Karabakh, yet are opposed to relinquish-
ing the area to Azerbaijan’s control.
51
Critics surmise that a
44. Id.; Karabakh Conflict Is Not Frozen, French Ambassador Says, supra
note 4; De Waal, supra note 11.
45. Nagorno-Karabakh Profile, supra note 1.
46. EUR. CT. H.R., AZERBAIJANI REFUGEE’S RIGHTS VIOLATED BY LACK OF
ACCESS TO THEIR PROPERTY LOCATED IN DISTRICT CONTROLLED BY ARMENIA 2
(2015), available at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?li-
brary=ECHR&id=003-5110589-6301087&filename=003-5110589-6301087.pdf
(“By the end of 1993, ethnic Armenian forces had gained control over almost
the entire territory of the former NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Ob-
last] as well as seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions.”).
47. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) “is
the world’s largest regional security organization. The OSCE works for stabil-
ity, peace and democracy for more than a billion people, through political dia-
logue and through practical work to build and sustain peace and stability.”
Ambassadors from each of its 57 member states regularlymeet to discuss strat-
egies for preventing and managing global conflicts. What Is the OSCE?, OSCE
(Aug. 2018), https://www.osce.org/whatistheosce/factsheet?download=true.
48. On March 23, 1995, the OSCE formed a group of delegates called the
OSCE Minsk Group to address the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and “to ob-
tain conclusion by the Parties of an agreement on the cessation of the armed
conflict in order to permit the convening of the Minsk Conference. . . .” Man-
date, OSCEMINSKGROUP, https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/108308 (last vis-
ited Oct. 5, 2018).
49. Who We Are, OSCEMINSK GROUP, http://www.osce.org/mg/108306 (last
visited Oct. 5, 2018).
50. Karabakh Conflict Is Not Frozen, French Ambassador Says, supra note
4 (“[T]he OSCE Minsk Group has a co-chairmanship institution, comprised of
Russian, the US and French co-chairs, which began operating in 1996.”).
51. General Assembly Adopts Resolution Reaffirming Territorial Integrity
of Azerbaijan, supra note 12.
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Minsk-negotiated peace agreement is impossible, claiming that
it remains in Russia’s best interests to maintain instability be-
tween Armenia and Azerbaijan.
52
Others accuse the co-chairs of
shirking more proactive roles in the hopes that the conflict will
resolve itself.
53
The Armenian and Azeri governments add to this
52. See Clete Stevens, The ¶Putin Parachute’ ² Russian Influence in U.S. by
Way of Armenia, INT’L POL’Y DIG. (July 7, 2018), https://intpolicydi-
gest.org/2018/07/07/the-putin-parachute-russian-influence-in-u-s-by-way-of-
armenia/ (Armenia depends “on Russian military support for a conflict with
Azerbaijan that Russia continues to stoke, funding and supporting both sides
of the disagreement. Russia’s interests are clearly to keep Azerbaijan and Ar-
menia in strife, inflating a demand for Russian military presence in the region
and consolidating Russian forces closer to the West.”); see also PATRICIA
CARLEY, NAGORNO-KARABAKH: SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION, A UNITED STATES
INSTITUTE OFPEACEROUNDTABLEREPORT 1 (1998) (“Stalin knew that by includ-
ing the disputed and by then majority Armenian-populated region wholly
within the boundaries of the new Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, it would for-
ever remain a sore spot between the two republics that would ensure Moscow’s
position as power broker.”); De Waal, supra note 11 (while Russia is not the
“real villain[,] [f]or sure, the Kremlin has played a role in manipulating the
ethno-territorial conflicts. . . . And Russia continues to sell weapons to both
Armenia and Azerbaijan.”).
53. General Assembly Adopts Resolution Reaffirming Territorial Integrity
of Azerbaijan, supra note 12; Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, supra note
12, at 8 (“A main criticism of the Minsk Group is that it facilitates but is loath
to apply pressure”) (citation omitted); Karabakh Conflict Is Not Frozen, French
Ambassador Says, supra note 4 (quoting the French Ambassador to Armenia
as “fully loyal to its co-chair’s commitments within theMinsk Group. But solely
the parties [to this conflict] can achieve the settlement of the conflict.”); Nasimi
Aghayev, Nagorno-Karabakh: A Threat to Stability and US Interests, HILL
(July 2, 2014), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/211096-na-
gorno-karabakh-a-threat-to-stability-and-us-interests (calling on the U.S. gov-
ernment to “be more active and forthright in leading the global community to
condemn Armenia for the occupation, and demand that it abide by interna-
tional law.”); cf. U.S. Relations With Azerbaijan, U.S. DEP’T. ST. (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2909.htm (“The United States strongly sup-
ports efforts to peacefully resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and [for Azer-
baijan to] reopen the closed border with Armenia, and promote regional stabil-
ity, peace, and prosperity,” while failing to state whether it would be making
such efforts). In some instances, U.S. politicians have publicly undermined the
nation’s neutrality in its Minsk peace-making role, see, e.g., Stevens, supra
note 52 (“[American] [p]oliticians have been known to visit Armenian sepa-
ratists despite vociferous objections from the State Department. . . . Addition-
ally, the U.S. recently granted an entrance visa to the de-facto leader of the
rebel state.”).
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unlikelihood of a political peace agreement,
54
as deep-seated an-
imosity hardens between the two nations.
55
Since Nagorno-Karabakh’s declaration of independence, Azer-
baijan has forbidden any traveler with a Nagorno-Karabakh Re-
public passport stamp from entering its borders.
56
In addition,
media outlets report that Azeri authorities outright deny Arme-
nian citizens entry to Azerbaijan.
57
The Azeri national soccer
team even refused to host the Armenian team in Azerbaijan’s
capital, Baku,
58
during an international qualifying round to
avoid the appearance of cooperating with the Armenian govern-
ment.
59
Meanwhile, Armenia has taken public steps to resettle previ-
ously-populated areas throughout Nagorno-Karabakh.
60
In April
2017, Nagorno-Karabakh Republic government officials opened
a new settlement in the Nagorno-Karabakh region,
61
part of an
overarching strategy to repopulate the area.
62
Financial and ma-
terial support comes from the regional and national Armenian
government,
63
as well as the Armenian Cultural Association of
America Artsakh Fund of the Eastern U.S.,
64
an American-
54. See De Waal, supra note 11 (“What is missing in the South Caucasus is
the political will to engage with a plan that involves doing a deal with the en-
emy.”).
55. See id. (“More than 20 years on, nationalist hatreds have not abated. In
fact, they’ve been fed over the years by official propaganda on both sides.”);
Haykuhi Barseghyan & Shahla Sultanova, History Lessons in Armenia and
Azerbaijan, INSTIT. WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Mar. 2, 2012),
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/history-lessons-armenia-and-azerbaijan (high-
lighting the incendiary and discriminatory comments about Armenia and
Azerbaijan in the other country’s government-approved school textbooks).
56. Azerbaijan International Travel Information: Entry, Exit, and Visa Re-
quirements, U.S. DEP’T ST. ³ BUREAU CONSULAR AFF.,
https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/country/azerbaijan.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 6, 2017).
57. Azerbaijan Doesn’t Allow Armenians in the Country, PANARMENIAN
NETWORK (May 7, 2008), http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/world/news/25889/.
58. SeeDEWAAL, supra note 14, at 5.
59. Fariz Ismailzade, NGOs in Azerbaijan Criticized for Contacts with
Karabakh, 3 EURASIA DAILY MONITOR 170 (2006), available at https://jame-
stown.org/program/ngos-in-azerbaijan-criticized-for-contacts-with-karabakh/.
60. Janbazian, supra note 14.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Chiragov v. Armenia, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 169²70 (2015).
64. Janbazian, supra note 14; see Donate to Artsakh, ARM. CULTURAL ASS’N
AM. (2017), https://acaainc.org/artsakh/.
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based organization that “sponsors projects both in the Republic
of Armenia and the Diaspora.”
65
Because Nagorno-Karabakh’s
government is not internationally recognized, Armenia provides
the residents with Armenian passports known as Artsakh pass-
ports, which include a special stamp signifying the Nagorno-
Karabakh territory.
66
Nagorno-Karabakh is currently home to
approximately 146,600 people, an estimated 95% of whom are
ethnic Armenian.
67
While Armenia financially and politically
supports resettlement, Azerbaijan considers it to be illegal insti-
gation.
68
Unsurprisingly, the tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh sporad-
ically erupt in violence.
69
In March 2016, Azerbaijan’s troops and
the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’s militia fought near the
Talysh-area settlements
70
in the southeast of Azerbaijan.
71
A 12-
year-old Armenian boy, as well as three other civilian residents,
65. About, ARM. CULTURAL ASS’N AM. (2017), https://acaainc.org/about/.
66. Residents of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic are issued “Karabakh
passports [that] are fully identical with Armenian ones except that they will
contain a special stamp notifying their carriers’ place of residence.” Karabakh
Residents to Use Armenian Passports, ASBAREZ (Sept. 9, 1998), http://asba-
rez.com/37213/karabakh-residents-to-use-armenian-passports/. According to
the deputy speaker of the Armenian parliament, Albert Bazeyan, issuing Ar-
menian passports to Nagorno-Karabakh residents “does not violate Azerbai-
jan’s territorial integrity. ¶Karabakh has never been part of Azerbaijan,’ he
claimed.” Id.
67. See Nagorno-Karabakh Profile, supra note 1; see also General Infor-
mation, OFF. NKR PRESIDENT, http://www.president.nkr.am/en/nkr/generalIn-
formation/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2017) (stating that of the estimated 146,600
people living in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2013, 95% of the population was Arme-
nian, and the remaining 5% consisted of “Russians, Ukrainians, Greeks, Geor-
gians, Azerbaijanis and others.”); The World Factbook: Azerbaijan, supra note
3 (estimating in 2009 that “the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh region is popu-
lated almost entirely by ethnic Armenians . . . .”).
68. General Assembly Adopts Resolution Reaffirming Territorial Integrity
of Azerbaijan, supra note 12.
69. Nagorno-Karabakh Profile, supra note 1; De Waal, supra note 11.
70. See G. Melvin Howe et al., Azerbaijan, ENCYCLOPÆDIABRITANNICA (July
24, 2018), https://www.britannica.com/place/Azerbaijan (referring to “[t]he
Talysh, or Talishi” as an “Iranian people who form the bulk of the local popu-
lation” in rural, southeastern Azerbaijan).
71. Nagorno-Karabakh Truce Holds, but Residents Fear Renewed Violence,
supra note 17.
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were killed during military shelling.
72
Dozens of soldiers per-
ished on both sides.
73
II. WHAT ISOCCUPATION?
Within the framework of international law, “occupation . . . ex-
ists when a state exercises actual authority over the territory, or
part of the territory, of an enemy state.”
74
However, its applica-
tion has changed as humanitarian norms of customary interna-
tional law solidified during the nineteenth century.
75
First, this
section describes occupation law’s historical origins, beginning
with the right of conquest, then belligerent occupation, and fi-
nally the emergence of individual rights leading to the first cod-
ifications of occupation law. Second, this section outlines modern
international occupation law by focusing on the Fourth Geneva
72. Bronwen Latimer, Haunting Photos Show the Devastation of Nagorno-
Karabakh’s Ongoing Conflict, WASH. POST (May 11, 2016), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/in-sight/wp/2016/05/11/haunting-photos-show-the-dev-
astation-of-nagorno-karabakhs-ongoing-conflict/?utm_term=.7a419993bacb.
73. Nagorno-Karabakh Profile, supra note 1.
74. Chiragov v. Armenia, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 180²81 (2015) (citations
omitted). The Court further elaborates that “[t]he requirement of actual au-
thority is widely considered to be synonymous to that of effective control.” Id.
See alsoOrna Ben-Naftali et al., Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 551, 560 (2005), https://scholar-
ship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol23/iss3/2/ (defining occupation as “the effective
control of a power . . . over a territory to which that power has no sovereign
title, without the volition of the sovereign of that territory.”) (quoting Eyal Ben-
venisti, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 4 (1993)); but see Adam Rob-
erts, What is a Military Occupation?, 55 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L. 249, 249 (1985),
https://doi.org/10.1093/bybil/55.1.249 (“Michel Veuthey has gone so far as to
say that ¶the concept of ¶occupation’ is juridically inoperative or disputed in
practically all contemporary conflicts, including those involving guerrilla war-
fare.’”) (quoting MICHEL VEUTHEY, GUERILLA ET DROIT HUMANITAIRE 355 (2nd
ed., 1983)).
75. Grant T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral Occupation, 24 BERKELEY J.
INT’ L. 1, 4 (2006), https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol24/iss1/1/ (“The
traditional international law of occupation is a subset of the law of war, also
termed international humanitarian law or the laws of armed conflict. . . . Oc-
cupation began to be distinguished from acquisition of territory in the latter
half of the eighteenth century, yet the concept of military occupation was
mostly developed after the Napoleonic Wars. . . . International humanitarian
law became increasingly codified over time.”) (citations omitted); see also Pro-
tocol I, supra note 10 (In 1977, Additional Protocol I was “adopted by States to
make international humanitarian law more complete and more universal, and
to adapt it better to modern conflicts. . . . Protocol I deals with international
armed conflicts.”).
462 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:1
Convention and the Additional Protocol I of 1977 (“Additional
Protocol”).
76
A. Overview of the Origins of the International Law of Occupa-
tion
77
During the mid-nineteenth century, the idea of “belligerent oc-
cupation” emerged as a separate and distinct concept
78
from the
traditional “right of conquest.”
79
Belligerent occupation is the
possession or control over a territory
80
without conferring own-
ership to the occupier.
81
Sovereign rights to the territory remain
with the “ousted government,” while the military occupier main-
tains limited administrative control of the occupied territory.
82
76. Protocol I, supra note 10.
77. For a detailed history, see Eyal Benvenisti, The Origins of the Concept
of Belligerent Occupation, 26 L. & HIST. REV. 621 (2008), https://www.re-
searchgate.net/publication/228161576_The_Origins_of_the_Concept_of_Bel-
ligerent_Occupation.
78. Jean L. Cohen, The Role of International Law in Post-Conflict Constitu-
tion-Making: Toward a Jus Post Bellum for ´Interim Occupations,µ 51 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 496, 503 (2006), https://www.researchgate.net/publica-
tion/267721492_The_Role_of_International_Law_in_Post-Conflict_Constitu-
tion-Making_Toward_a_Jus_Post_Bellum_for_Interim_Occupations (“[T]he
first codification of the law of belligerent occupation was prepared by Dr. Fran-
cis Lieber during the American Civil War in an 1863 text. . . . [The concept’s]
original articulation . . . is attributed to Emmerich de Vattel, although the first
usage of the concept was by a German publicist in 1844.”).
79. See generally SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE
ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 39²
40 (1996).
80. Convention (II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land
art. 43, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 403 T.S. 247, 259, available at https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/150?OpenDocument&redirect=0
[hereinafter “1899 Hague Convention”] (“Territory is considered occupied when
it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation
extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and
can be exercised.”).
81. Id. art. 43 (“The authority of the legitimate power having actually
passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his
power to re-establish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety,
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the coun-
try.”); see Cohen, supra note 78, at 503.
82. Benvenisti, supra note 77, at 622. This cuts against the traditional in-
ternational conquest, where a foreign belligerent state could occupy another
state and then assume governmental control of the territory. See also KORMAN,
supra note 79, at 123.
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In the Enlightenment era,
83
philosophical and social thought
supporting individual free will and rights began to undermine
the State’s absolute control, particularly through military con-
quest.
84
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s
85
The Social Contract
86
es-
poused the rights of people leading up to the French Revolution
87
in 1789.
88
In his 1797 ±uvre, The Law of Nations, Swiss diplo-
mat and jurist, Emer de Vattel,
89
asserted that contemporary
83. Enlightenment, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britan-
nica.com/event/Enlightenment-European-history (last visited Nov. 12, 2017)
(The Enlightenment was “a European intellectual movement of the 17th and
18th centuries in which ideas concerning God, reason, nature, and humanity
were synthesized into a worldview that gained wide assent in the West and
that instigated revolutionary developments in art, philosophy, and politics.”).
See KORMAN, supra note 79, at 31.
84. KORMAN, supra note 79, at 36 (“The rejection of the patrimonial princi-
ple, according to which the people could be bartered about at the will of the
ruler, represents the international version of (the radical wing) of the French
Enlightenment’s attack upon the domestic absolutism of the ancien régime.”).
However, there were exceptions to the restrictions against patrimonial con-
quest, including forceful acquisition of infidel and barbarian nations. Id. at 47²
56.
85. See G. D. H. Cole, Introduction, in JEAN-JACQUESROUSSEAU, THESOCIAL
CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES BY JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU (G. D. H. Cole ed.
trans., 1923), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/rousseau-the-social-
contract-and-discourses.
86. Id. (“Sovereignty, being nothing less than the exercise of the general
will, can never be alienated. . . .”).
87. French Revolution, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/french-revo-
lution (last visited Oct. 3, 2018) (“Like the American Revolution before it, the
French Revolution was influenced by Enlightenment ideals, particularly the
concepts of popular sovereignty and inalienable rights . . . . [T]he movement
played a critical role in shaping modern nations by showing the world the
power inherent in the will of the people.”).
88. See KORMAN, supra note 79, at 37 (“Vattel’s assertion of the rights of
peoples against the rights of rulers . . . was later to become known [as] the
doctrine of the self-determination of peoples. This doctrine, which became in
1789 the ideology of the French Revolution . . . spread across Europe to an
extent that made it impossible for the patrimonial principle to be restored or
incorporated as it had previously been into international law or morality.”); see
generally LORI FISHER DAMROSCH & SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CAES ANDMATERIALS 307 (6th ed. 2014).
89. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS,
WITHTHREEEARLYESSAYS ON THEORIGIN ANDNATURE OFNATURAL LAW AND ON
LUXURY (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whitmore eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1797),
available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/vattel-the-law-of-nations-lf-ed.
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“principles countenanced by reason and conformable to human-
ity”
90
were antithetical to the “monstrous”
91
patrimonial norm of
one nation conquering another nation’s territory by force and de-
claring ownership over the conquered people without their con-
sent.
92
An international consensus of protecting occupied peo-
ples’ rights, however, would not develop for over a century.
93
The 1899 Second Hague Convention’s Regulations Concerning
the Laws and Customs of War on Land codified occupation law,
94
mandating that a conquering, foreign state should follow the
conquered state’s national legislation, as opposed to its own.
95
The 1907 Hague Regulations repeated the mandate in Article
43.
96
The relevant law is expressed in one sentence, focusing on
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. KORMAN, supra note 79, at 36 (“According to Vattel, the patrimonial
principle was no part of the law of nations, for people could not be ¶acquired’ by
a conqueror. . . .”).
93. See Convention (II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land art. 43, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 403 T.S. 247, 259, available at
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ap-
plic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/150?OpenDocument&redirect=0 [hereinafter 1899
Hague Regulations] (requiring international protections for inhabitants of oc-
cupied territories).
94. 51 States are parties to the 1899 Hague Regulations. Id.
95. Id. (“The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into
the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to re-
establish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respect-
ing, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”).
96. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 8, art. 43; see Gregory H. Fox, The
Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 195, 235 (2005) (prior to the twentieth
century, warfare was conducted almost exclusively between armies, avoiding
civilian involvement. Therefore, belligerent “occupations were of relatively
short duration, during which occupants, by and large, retained existing legis-
lation as much as possible. The final codifications of occupation law adhered to
this minimalist conception of the occupier’s role.”); Harris, supra note 75, at 4²
5 (“The bedrock of the international law of occupation is found in the 1907
Hague Regulations, which establishes occupation as a question of fact. . . .”);
Solomon Ukhuegbe & Alero Fenemigho, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of
1907 Revisited: The Past and the Future of Belligerent Occupation in Interna-
tional Law, 16 U. BERLIN L.J. 266, 267 (2015), https://www.aca-
demia.edu/26851994/ARTICLE_43_OF_THE_HAGUE_REGULATIONS_OF_
1907_REVISITED_THE_PAST_AND_THE_FUTURE_OF_BELLIGERENT_
OCCUPATION_IN_INTERNATIONAL_LAW (asserting that “the core of this
regime [governing the exercise of military authority over hostile territory] is
article 43 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention IV concerning
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the restoration of civilian normalcy after an occupier establishes
power: “The authority of the legitimate power having in fact
passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all
the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as pos-
sible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country.”
97
A few years later, states largely followed Article 43 during
World War I.
98
After World War II, many states publicly agreed
that territorial conquest by force could no longer be an accepted
international legal norm.
99
Thus, belligerent occupation became
the accepted international stabilizing mechanism in wartime,
100
limiting and eventually replacing the ancient right of con-
quest.
101
B. The International Law of Occupation’s Purposes and Ques-
tions
Building on the rules of belligerent occupation afterWorldWar
II,
102
the Fourth Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocol
are considered the most recent codifications of the international
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which prescribes limits for the occu-
pant or Occupying Power, ¶a mini constitution’ of some sort.”).
97. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 8, art. 43.
98. See Ukhuegbe & Fenemigho, supra note 96, at 267 (“During that war
and the period immediately following, State practice was generally consistent
with the [Hague] Convention regime.”).
99. KORMAN, supra note 79, at 133.
100. Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 74, at 563 (describing the four features of
belligerent occupation recognized by contemporary occupation law: “(a) the oc-
cupation is undertaken by a belligerent state; (b) it is over a territory of an
enemy belligerent state; (c) it occurs during the course of war or armed conflict;
and, (d) before any armistice agreement is concluded. Also, the occupation ex-
tends only to those areas over which the occupant exercises effective control.”)
(citations omitted).
101. See generally KORMAN, supra note 79, at 133 (“The demise of the right
of conquest in the twentieth century” gave way to the law of belligerent occu-
pation).
102. The Allied states’ occupation of German and Japanese territory shaped
the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention’s regulation of international occupation.
See Harris, supra note 75, at 6 (“The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 was
crafted as a result of the World War II experience to better extend the protec-
tions of the laws of war to civilians and to further address the rights and duties
of occupying powers.”) (citations omitted); see generally KORMAN, supra note
79, at 214²48.
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law of occupation.
103
Moreover, the 1977 Additional Protocols al-
lowed sovereign states that were previously colonies during
World War II to contribute to and become parties to the Fourth
Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocols.
104
Together,
these treaties reflect international occupation law’s shift to-
wards addressing humanitarian
105
and sovereignty
106
concerns
103. Amanda Alexander, International Humanitarian Law, Postcolonialism
and the 1977 Geneva Protocol I, 17 MELB. J. INT’L L. 15, 16 (2016) (“[T]he 1977
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, are the core of contemporary
international humanitarian law.”); Cohen, supra note 78, at 511 (Security
Council Resolution 1483, recognizing the United States and British forces in
Iraq as occupying powers, is viewed as “the latest and most authoritative re-
statement of several basic principles of contemporary occupation law” and
“[c]alls upon all concerned to comply fully with their obligations under inter-
national law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and The
Hague Regulations of 1907. . . .”). As of 2017, 196 States have ratified the
Fourth Geneva Convention, including Armenia and Azerbaijan. See Geneva
Convention, supra note 9. The Convention and its Additional Protocols’ promo-
tion of self-determination and humanitarianism is also supported by the U.N.
Charter and other binding resolutions. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24,
1970); U.N. Charter arts. 1, 55; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
104. Protocols I and II Additional to the Geneva Conventions, INT’L COMM.
RED CROSS (Jan. 1, 2009), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/docu-
ments/misc/additional-protocols-1977.htm (“[M]ost of the countries that be-
came independent after 1945 ¶inherited’ the Geneva Conventions from the for-
mer colonial powers ² the adoption of the Protocols was also an occasion for
them to contribute to developing the law.”). 174 States are parties to the 1949
Geneva Conventions and to Additional Protocol I. While Armenia is a party to
both, Azerbaijan is only a party to the Geneva Conventions. See Protocol I,
supra note 10.
105. See Cohen, supra note 78, at 511 (“In the context of an occupation that
results in regime change, this orientation suggests that the identity of the trus-
tee has shifted from the ousted sovereign to the civilian population. This im-
plies a new focus on the welfare and basic rights of the civilian population,
guided by the principle of humanity.” (quotations omitted)).
106. See Gregory H. Fox, Humanitarian Occupation, 07²41 WAYNE ST. U. L.
SCH. LEGAL STUDIES RES. PAPER SERIES 1, 8 (2008), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1032661 (finding that the U.N.’s
involvement in the Bosnia-Kosovo occupation “suggest[s] humanitarian occu-
pation is a profound expression of support for maintaining existing borders and
demographic profiles.”); see also Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, supra note 96, at
236²37 (in the effort to prevent annexation, “[t]he occupier thus assumes only
as much of the displaced sovereign’s authority as is necessary to administer
the territory, but no more. General legislative competence remains with the
displaced regime as the continuing de jure authority over the territory.”).
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by encompassing more occupation situations outside of tradi-
tional belligerent occupation
107
³such as indiscriminate attacks
on civilians
108
³and applying “new rules on international armed
conflicts” to shield civilians from harm.
109
However, vulnerable
gaps remain that threaten the law’s well-intentioned pur-
poses.
110
1. Preserving State Sovereignty
In the Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 4 codifies the preser-
vation of the occupied government’s authority over the occupied
territory, stating that the territory’s legal status remains unaf-
fected by occupation.
111
The occupied state’s sovereignty is fur-
ther protected by Articles 47 and 49.
112
Both articles restrict how
an occupying state may eventually acquire legal title to occupied
territory. Article 49 prohibits an occupier from short-circuiting
107. Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 74, at 566²67 (The Fourth Geneva Con-
vention reflected the “international recognition of the need to apply occupation
laws to situations outside traditional belligerent occupation [which] has taken
root in contemporary international law.”).
108. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 51(5), (6).
109. Alexander, supra note 103, at 16; see also Ben-Naftali et al., supra note
74, at 566 (“[T]he Protocol promoted humanitarian concerns over military ne-
cessity.”).
110. Harris, supra note 75, at 21 (“Occupants act in a lacuna of international
law because there is no body of law regulating the conditions of the devolution
of sovereignty to the occupied population. . . . Simultaneously, the demise of
debellatio has left a gap in international law that cannot be filled by the inter-
stitial laws of occupation.”).
111. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 4 (“[T]he occupation of a territory” does
not “affect the legal status of the territory in question.”); see KORMAN, supra
note 79, at 217 (“There is not an atom of sovereignty in the authority of the
occupant. . . .”) (quoting L. Oppenheim, The Legal Relations Between an Occu-
pying Power and the Inhabitants, 33 L.Q. REV. 363, 365 (1917)), affirming the
“long-established principle of customary international law . . . that mere con-
quest or military occupation of territory cannot produce a transfer of title to
the conqueror, this requiring some further legal act, such as formal annexation
or cession under a treaty of peace.”).
112. Geneva Convention, supra note 9, arts. 47, 49; see KORMAN, supra note
79, at 219 (“That the rights of the occupying power do not include the right of
annexation³or the right to exercise sovereignty over the occupied territory³
is made clear in Articles 47 and 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.”).
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sovereignty
113
by forbidding forcible, unjustified transfers or de-
portations of native civilians,
114
as well as prohibiting the occu-
pier from repopulating the state with its own civilians.
115
Article
47 continues to confer the protections of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention to the occupied population, even in the event of a pur-
ported annexation by the foreign occupier.
116
For the first time,
the international law of occupation directly addresses the need
to protect the rights of the occupied people, separate from the
occupied state’s rights.
117
Article 6 ensures the continued appli-
cation of Articles 47 and 49 during an occupation, even after mil-
itary fighting has ceased.
118
113. U.N. Charter, arts. 1, ¶ 2, 55.
114. Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 49 (“Individual or mass forcible
transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory
. . . are prohibited, regardless of their motive,” although evacuations for secu-
rity reasons are permitted).
115. Id. (“The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own
civilian population into the territory it occupies.”); KORMAN, supra note 79, at
219 (similar to Article 47, Article 49 “prohibits with respect to occupied terri-
tory an important expression of territorial sovereignty³in this case, the right
to establish permanent civilian settlements.”).
116. Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 47 (“Protected persons who are in
occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatso-
ever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as
the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government
of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities
of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by
the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.”).
117. See KORMAN, supra note 79, at 219 (“Article 47, while it takes account of
the possibility, if not the legality, of annexation of the whole or part of the oc-
cupied territory, guarantees, in such a case, that protected persons are not de-
prived of their rights under the Convention ² an indication that sovereignty
may not, even in the event of a purported annexation, be acquired by the occu-
pant in respect of the inhabitants (and hence, in the case of inhabited terri-
tory).”).
118. KORMAN, supra note 79, at 220 (“Article 6(3) applies 47 and 49 even after
the close of military operations.”). Professor Korman contends that the prohi-
bition against territorial acquisition is irrespective of the original military ac-
tion’s legality. Id. at 223²24 (“[T]he old doctrine that unilateral annexation ²
whereby the occupying power extends its own civil administration over the
conquered territory, incorporating it into the body of its own state territory ²
serves to bring a war which is materially over, legally or formally to a close,
has today been officially repudiated.”). Cf. U.N. Charter, art. 2, ¶ 4 (“[F]orce
shall not be used or threatened against the territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of any state” covers before the end of military operations by pro-
hibiting use of force in acquiring territory); G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note
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2. Protecting Civilian Welfare
Article 10 of the Fourth Geneva Convention clarifies that none
of the provisions should be interpreted as undermining any hu-
manitarian relief that an organization may provide to aid an oc-
cupied population.
119
In the Additional Protocol, Article 48 re-
quires the occupier to differentiate between civilians and com-
batants, and then Article 50 obligates protecting those civilians
during military attacks.
120
Similarly, Articles 62 and 63 of the
Additional Protocol provide protections to civil defense organiza-
tions, such as the Red Cross, and prohibit occupiers from inter-
fering in performing their duties to protect civilians and provide
relief.
121
The Additional Protocol articles 69, 70 and 71 specify the type
of relief that an occupier state should provide for occupied civil-
ians identified in the Fourth Geneva Convention.
122
For exam-
ple, Article 69 requires that the occupier provide “clothing, bed-
ding, means of shelter, other supplies essential to the survival of
the civilian population of the occupied territory and objects nec-
essary for religious worship.”
123
The Additional Protocol calls for
implementing the Fourth Geneva Convention provisions imme-
diately, as well as providing relief.
124
Thus, the international law of occupation tasks the occupier
with the responsibility of protecting the occupied people, while
103 (“The territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation re-
sulting from the use of force in contravention of the provisions of the Charter.”).
119. Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 10 (“[P]rovisions of the present
Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian
organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict con-
cerned, undertake for the protection of civilian persons and for their relief.”).
120. Protocol I, supra note 10, arts. 48, 51; see also Alexander, supra note
103, at 29 (noting that Article 48 codified a humanitarian “principle of protec-
tion and of distinction” foundational to regulating armed conflicts. Viewing Ar-
ticles 48 and 51 together, “the protection of civilians was established as a fun-
damental principle of international humanitarian law.”) (citation omitted).
121. Protocol I, supra note 10, arts. 62, 63.
122. Id. art. 68 (“The provisions of this Section apply to the civilian popula-
tion as defined in this Protocol and are supplementary to Articles 23, 55, 59,
60, 61 and 62 and other relevant provisions of the Fourth Convention.”).
123. Id. art. 69.
124. Id. (“Relief actions for the benefit of the civilian population of occupied
territories are governed by Articles 59, 60, 61, 62, 108, 109, 110 and 111 of the
Fourth Convention, and by Article 71 of this Protocol, and shall be
implemented without delay.”).
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receiving none of the glory in legal title to the occupied state.
125
Without a subsequent peace treaty or other binding legal docu-
ment, the occupier cannot claim sovereignty over occupied terri-
tory.
126
A lawful occupation limits the occupier’s meddling
127
in
the occupied territory’s internal affairs to the extent needed to
protect the occupying armed forces and the occupied state’s peo-
ple.
128
3. Leaving Humanitarian and Sovereignty Responsibilities
Open to Question
However, the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Additional
Protocol
129
leave questions open about an occupying state’s re-
125. AEYAL GROSS, THE WRITING ON THE WALL: RETHINKING THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OFOCCUPATION 18 (2017) (“Sovereignty and title to an oc-
cupied territory are not vested in the occupying power. This principle derives
from the inalienability of sovereignty, which cannot be breached through the
actual or threatened use of force. Under contemporary international law and
in view of the principle of self-determination, the said sovereignty is vested the
population under occupation.”). The current international law of occupation is
thus distinguishable from previously acceptable methods of acquiring title to
occupied land, including right to conquest following war or conflict, and terra
nullius, where “lands inhabited by non-Christian or ¶backward’ peoples were
regarded by the European powers as being automatically open to acquisition
by conquest.” KORMAN, supra note 79, at 41²42; Fox, Humanitarian Occupa-
tion, supra note 106, at 4 (“[O]ccupiers under humanitarian law do not assume
¶sovereign’ powers over territory. . . .”); cf. PETER STIRK, THE POLITICS OF
MILITARY OCCUPATION 230 (2009) (“Military occupation pushes sovereignty to
the point at which its existence and meaning are precarious. All that is left is
a hollow shell whose significance lies in a negative fact: the occupier is not
sovereign.”).
126. KORMAN, supra note 79, at 219²20 (“The basis of these rules [specifically
Articles 47 and 49] is that military occupation, being a temporary rather than
a permanent state of affairs, (citing Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occu-
pation, 84 AM. J. INT’LL. 44, 47 (1990)) gives to the occupant a provisional right
of administration only, pending the final peace settlement, and does not dis-
place the sovereignty of the conquered.” (emphasis omitted)).
127. Harris, supra note 75, at 23 (“[T]he law of occupation, especially the
Hague Regulations, placed emphasis on ¶the state elites as the primary bene-
ficiaries [of the law] and on the minimal involvement of the occupant in the
management of the affairs of the population under its temporary rule.”).
128. Id. at 24 (“[C]ontemporary expectations of governance and occupation
directly conflict with the law of occupation’s mantra to permit only minimal
meddling into the daily lives of occupied populations.”).
129. Although the Additional Protocol attempts to answer some of these
questions and is considered customary international law, see Alexander, supra
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sponsibilities regarding the occupied people’s welfare, particu-
larly in the case of prolonged occupation.
130
Part of the compro-
mise arranged to garner states’ support of the Fourth Geneva
Convention included leaving the duration of occupation open-
ended.
131
This concession to the Allied powers³the United
States, France, the United Kingdom, and the USSR
132
³who
were unsure of when their occupations of the Axis states would
end, creates uncertainty regarding the temporariness of occupa-
tion.
133
Although an occupation is generally considered to be a
temporary status,
134
the codified laws do not specify a limit for
note 103, at 16 (“Today, much of the Additional Protocols are considered to be
customary international law and binding on all states. Indeed, the ICRC’s 2005
study on customary international humanitarian law closely follows the re-
quirements of the Additional Protocol I.”), it was not universally accepted by
States. As of 2017, 174 states have ratified the Additional Protocol I out of the
196 that have ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention. Notably, Azerbaijan and
the United States are two of the missing parties. Armenia, France and the
Russian Federation have ratified both. See Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 10;
see also Alexander, supra note 103, at 28 (observing that before drafting the
Additional Protocols, “there was not much state practice that would suggest
that there were customary laws protecting civilians. Nevertheless, this defi-
ciency did not deter delegates from stating that there were such laws.”). There-
fore, it is questionable whether all States considered themselves bound by all
parts of the Protocol during an occupation.
130. See Kontorovich, supra note 5 (“[O]ne reason the Geneva Convention
may not have anticipated prolonged occupations is that its drafters did not
conceive of situations where occupation would not promptly lead to annexation,
or a peace deal on terms acceptable to both parties.”); Alexander, supra note
103, at 49²50 (noting the “many paradoxes and ambiguities” in the Additional
Protocol I, and the “many provisions that were, deliberately, left open to differ-
ent interpretations . . . Yet, the rules continued to stand in the documents,
until, after years of being shunned, they were called upon as a resource, inter-
preted in their most humane light, and then declared to be binding law by in-
ternational lawyers at the end of twentieth century.”).
131. See Kontorovich, supra note 5 (noting that the international law of occu-
pation “did not apparently include making long-term occupation more diffi-
cult.”).
132. The Allies, who hadmade secret treaties to divide up Axis territory post-
war, were exposed and denounced as imperialists by Russia. KORMAN, supra
note 79, at 137 (citation omitted).
133. Id.
134. KORMAN, supra note 79; compare GROSS, supra note 125, at 18 (“Occupa-
tion is temporary, and may neither be permanent nor indefinite.”), with Kon-
torovich, supra note 5. Cf. STIRK, supra note 125, at 43 (arguing that while
military occupation may be temporary, it is not “defined by the brevity of the
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how long a territory can remain occupied.
135
The application of
the principle of self-determination
136
further complicates the
questions of when occupation should end and who may be in
power post-occupation.
137
Moreover, an occupier’s humanitarian responsibilities de-
crease as an occupation continues,
138
creating a perverse incen-
tive for the occupier to prolong its control.
139
Article 6 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention begins with a mandate that “the ap-
plication of the present Convention shall cease one year after the
general close of military operations ends,” but then specifies pro-
visions for an occupier to follow “for the duration of the occupa-
tion.”
140
The exceptions hold the occupier to forty-three of the
Fourth Geneva Conventions’ provisions, while exempting it from
occupation or invalidated by prolonged occupation. As the concept of occupa-
tion crystallised, prolonged occupation was a recognized, if infrequent, occur-
rence.”).
135. Kontorovich, supra note 5.
136. GROSS, supra note 125, at 18 (“The occupying power is entrusted with
the management of public order and civil life in the territory under its control.
Given the principle of self-determination, the people under occupation are the
beneficiaries of this trust, and their dispossession and subjugation is thus a
violation of this trust.”).
137. Although Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requires that the
occupier follow certain provisions, there is no mention of when an occupation
should end or to whom power may be transferred. Geneva Convention, supra
note 9.
138. Id.
139. See Kontorovich, supra note 5 (explaining that under “the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention, Art. 6 exempts occupying powers from certain restrictions in
prolonged occupations. When the conventions were adopted, the Allied Powers
were engaged in preexisting occupations of Germany and Japan. In the draft-
ing of the conventions, the U.S. expressed concern that the new norms would
apply to its existing occupations. Art. 6 was in part a concession to this con-
cern.”).
140. Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 6 (requiring that “the Occupying
Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation . . . by the provisions
of the following Articles of the present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49,
51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143.”). Specific Articles that provide humanitarian pro-
tections are missing from this list of occupier responsibilities, inter alia: Article
16 mandates that the wounded, sick, infirm, and expectant mothers receive
special protection and respect; Article 17 requires both parties to strive to
agree to the removal of vulnerable persons from “besieged or encircled areas,”
and to allow the “passage of ministers of all religions, medical personnel and
medical equipment on their way to such areas”; and Article 18 prohibits civil-
ian hospitals from “be[ing] the object of attack. . . .”
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one-hundred seventeen³some arguably key civilian protec-
tions.
141
III. CORRUPTOCCUPATION
The international law of occupation’s purposes of protecting
the occupied state’s sovereignty and the occupied people’s wel-
fare are so far removed from the actual situation in Nagorno-
Karabakh
142
that the territory’s status has become one of corrupt
occupation. Corrupt occupation arises when the territory should
be considered occupied, but the gaps in the current international
law of occupation are exploited by both occupier and occupied
States, effectively rejecting the applicable law.
143
Armenia’s de
facto occupation of the territory for the past quarter of a cen-
tury
144
and Azerbaijan’s violent response fail to comply with
141. See id. and accompanying text.
142. Azeris and Armenians are victims of humanitarian violations each year
when hostilities over Nagorno-Karabakh reignite, see Nagorno-Karabakh
Truce Holds, but Residents Fear Renewed Violence, supra note 17.
143. This situation is related to Professors Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michaeli’s
“illegal occupation,” when the “the boundaries between normal order (i.e., sov-
ereign equality between states) and the exception (i.e., occupation) are
blurred.” Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 74, at 551. However, illegal occupation
refers to “the breach of trust by the occupier.” Id. at 553²56, 586; see also
GROSS, supra note 125, at 160²62 (condemning the Israeli government’s “pick-
and-choose” method of applying occupation law as illegal). The difference be-
tween corrupt and illegal occupation hinges not so much on whether the occu-
pied or occupying state are abiding by international law, but rather whether
contravention of the law implies the need to reframe the law itself. In the case
of Nagorno-Karabakh, the area’s convoluted history of ownership, see supra
Part II, lends legitimacy to both Armenia and Azerbaijan’s contrasting views
of sovereignty. Labeling the occupation as “illegal” would only serve to incite
further conflict between the two States, leaving the international law of occu-
pation open to misuse in future situations. Moreover, the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross notes that once a territory’s factual situation amounts
to an occupation, the law of occupation applies “whether or not the occupation
is considered lawful . . . indeed whether it is called an ¶invasion,’ ¶liberation,’
¶administration,’ or ¶occupation.’” Occupation and International Humanitarian
Law: Questions and Answers, supra note 7. Therefore, the author has chosen
to view this corrupt occupation as inviting reformulation of the applicable in-
ternational law to the occupation’s factual circumstances, as opposed to ana-
lyzing its legality.
144. Far from acting in a limited capacity in the occupied territory, the Ar-
menian government controls the territory and its residents through the Na-
gorno-Karabakh’s government, see supra notes 63, 66 and accompanying text.
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modern international occupation law,
145
creating a corrupt occu-
pation rife with danger and instability.
146
This section discusses
the immediate and long-term effects of corrupt occupation in Na-
gorno-Karabakh and the applicable occupation law.
A. Death, Destruction, and Displacement³The Immediate Ef-
fects of Corrupt Occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh
The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh killed, injured or dis-
placed over a million people,
147
and the subsequent corrupt occu-
pation permits violence to continue.
148
The widespread harm to
civilians during the initial military conflict contradicts the
Fourth Geneva Convention’s articles requiring protection of the
occupied population.
149
As Armenia asserted control over the re-
gion, the fighting displaced residents from their homes
150
in con-
travention of Article 69’s requirement that the occupying power
provide shelter and necessities to the occupied people.
151
To date,
neither ethnic Azerbaijanis who were displaced from Nagorno-
Karabakh
152
nor ethnic Armenians who were displaced from
Azerbaijan have been allowed to return to their homes.
153
More-
over, the outbursts of military violence by Azeri and Armenian
troops have taken the lives of thousands of civilians.
154
These
dangerous and unstable conditions prevent Nagorno-Karabakh
145. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 3, 4; Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 51.
146. See supra notes 54²56 and accompanying text.
147. Nagorno-Karabakh Profile, supra note 1; De Waal, supra note 11.
148. Latimer, supra note 72; Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, supra
note 12, at 7.
149. Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, supra note 12, at 7; see also Cohen,
supra note 78, at 502.
150. Nagorno-Karabakh Profile, supra note 1; see also Nagorno-Karabakh: A
Plan for Peace, supra note 12, at 6.
151. Karabakh Conflict Is Not Frozen, French Ambassador Says, supra note
4.
152. Chiragov v. Armenia, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 135 (2015).
153. Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 11, 32 (2015).
154. Nagorno-Karabakh Profile, supra note 1. In addition to the deaths in
Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian take-over sparked ethnic cleansing riots
against Armenians in Sumgayit, Azerbaijan. DE WAAL, supra note 14, at 40²
41. Additionally, “[a]s a result of the repression carried out in Armenia, 220
Azerbaijanis had been killed, 1,154 wounded and approximately 250,000 ex-
pelled.” General Assembly Adopts Resolution Reaffirming Territorial Integrity
of Azerbaijan, supra note 12.
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civilians from normal living, undermining the purpose of occu-
pation law to protect and support the civilian population.
155
B. The Long-Term, Negative Effects of Corrupt Occupation in
Nagorno-Karabakh
Over time, the corrupt occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh has
spawned confusing international jurisprudence concerning occu-
pation. Moreover, failure to adhere to occupation law has en-
trenched a sense of injustice on both sides, fueling Azerbaijanis
and Armenians with bitterness and hatred that is passed from
one generation to the next.
156
1. Spawning Confusing International Jurisprudence
The corrupt occupation and displacement of both Armenians
and Azerbaijanis have resulted in ill-fitting international judi-
cial opinions. Although the Fourth Geneva Convention does not
specify that an occupying state needs to be physically present in
the occupied territory for the international laws of occupation to
apply,
157
the European Court of Human Rights placed heavy em-
phasis on an occupier’s physical presence in the case of Chiragov
v. Armenia.
158
In Chiragov, six Azerbaijani refugees and their families who
were displaced from their homes in Nagorno-Karabakh brought
suit against Armenia for violating their right to property under
the European Convention on Human Rights.
159
The Court ap-
plied a “boots on the ground” test
160
to determine if Armenia was
currently occupying Nagorno-Karabakh, which required Arme-
nian troops’ physical presence.
161
Although the Court had re-
ceived conflicting reports about the number and type of military
155. Harris, supra note 75, at 24 (critiquing “the law of occupation’s mantra
to permit only minimal meddling into the daily lives of occupied populations”
as counterintuitive to the occupier’s expectations of governing the civilian pop-
ulation).
156. Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, supra note 12, at 3.
157. See Geneva Convention, supra note 9.
158. Chiragov v. Armenia, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 180 (2015).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. (“Military occupation is considered to exist in a territory, or part of a
territory, if the following elements can be demonstrated: the presence of for-
eign troops, which are in a position to exercise effective control without the
consent of the sovereign.”); see also GROSS, supra note 125, at 111²13 (“The
Court thus again established a link between occupation and effective control,
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forces in Nagorno-Karabakh,
162
it ultimately recognized that Ar-
menia was exercising effective control through extensive finan-
cial, political and military involvement.
163
In an era when technology and transportation easily allow one
state to control another from afar in a de facto occupation, the
“boots on the ground” rule is confusing and unnecessary.
164
Na-
gorno-Karabakh is a case where the Armenian government fun-
nels money,
165
administrative support,
166
and military assis-
tance
167
into the occupied territory to maintain control from afar.
This ill-fitting jurisprudence allows for increased violence and a
lack of accountability.
168
but went a step further and stated that ¶physical presence of foreign troops is
a sine qua non requirement of occupation,’ adding that ¶occupation is not con-
ceivable without ¶boots on the ground’’ and, therefore, forces exercising naval
or air control do not suffice.”).
162. Chiragov, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 212 (“The material available to the
Court does not³and could not be expected to³provide conclusive evidence as
to the composition of the armed forces that occupied and secured control of
Nagorno-Karabakh and the seven surrounding districts between the outbreak
of war in early 1992 and the ceasefire in May 1994.”).
163. Id. ¶ 186 (concluding that Armenia exercises effective control over Na-
gorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories through its “military, politi-
cal, financial and other support. . . .”).
164. See GROSS, supra note 125, at 111²13 (arguing that the European Court
of Human Rights “position ignores political and technological changes that al-
low for occupation to take other forms, and was apparently not necessary for
making the judgement about Armenia’s responsibility.”).
165. Chiragov, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 169, 216 (based upon evidence of
Armenia loaning³without plan for repayment³and Armenian organizations
donating millions of dollars annually to Nagorno-Karabakh, the Court con-
cluded “that the ¶NKR’ would not be able to subsist economically without the
substantial support stemming from Armenia.”).
166. Id. ¶ 182 (determining that, despite presenting an independent govern-
ment, Nagorno-Karabakh’s “political dependence on Armenia is evident not
only from the mentioned interchange of prominent politicians, but also from
the fact that its residents acquire Armenian passports for travel abroad. . . .”).
167. Id. ¶ 180 (finding that “the Republic of Armenia, through its military
presence and the provision of military equipment and expertise, has been sig-
nificantly involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from an early date. This
military support has been ² and continues to be ² decisive for the conquest of
and continued control over the territories in issue, and the evidence, not the
least the 1994 military co-operation agreement, convincingly shows that the
armed forces of Armenia and the ¶NKR’ are highly integrated.”).
168. GROSS, supra note 125, at 246²47 (applying a ¶boots on the ground’ test
to determine occupation “enables the occupying state that ¶disengaged’ but re-
mained in control . . . to use greater force against the occupied population”
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2. Deteriorating Relations Between Caucasus Neighbors
Corrupt occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh has also resulted in
deteriorating relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
169
Re-
cent military clashes,
170
coupled with unilateral resettlement of
Nagorno-Karabakh,
171
further deepen the acrimonious schism
between the neighboring countries.
172
Moreover, Nagorno-
Karabakh and the surrounding militarized regions comprise ap-
proximately one-fifth of Azerbaijan’s territory,
173
a physical re-
while simultaneously shedding accountability); YEHOUDAA. SHENHAV, BEYOND
THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION: A JEWISH POLITICAL ESSAY 19 (2012) (“As colonial
history has taught us, occupation can be administered from a distance, without
permanent military presence and without settlers.”). I would argue that this
interpretation is not at odds with the International Committee of the Red
Cross’s statement that “it is solely the facts on the ground that determine [the
international law of occupation’s] application.” Occupation and International
Humanitarian Law: Questions and Answers, supra note 7. Even without a
physical military presence in Nagorno-Karabakh, the fact remains that the
government and territory is under its control.
169. Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, supra note 12, at 15 (warning
against “a cycle of growing hostilities” between Armenia and Azerbaijan as
“[n]othing has been done on the ground [in Nagorno-Karabakh] to build confi-
dence and trust, demilitarise and demobilise, or resume trade and communi-
cations”); MIKHELIDZE&PIROZZI, supra note 5, at 57 (predicting that the years
of conflict and violent occupation “make conflict settlement impossible. There
are certain societal beliefs, imaginations, and interpretations around collective
memories of confronted parties that are unlikely to change in the foreseeable
future.”).
170. Karabakh Conflict Is Not Frozen, French Ambassador Says, supra note
4.
171. General Assembly Adopts Resolution Reaffirming Territorial Integrity
of Azerbaijan, supra note 12; see also Janbazian, supra note 14; DEWAAL, su-
pra note 14, at 49.
172. Karabakh Conflict Is Not Frozen, French Ambassador Says, supra note
4; ¶Frozen Conflict or a War in Bain-Marie’ ³ Diario de Noticias Publishes Ar-
ticle on NK Conflict, ARMENPRESS (Dec. 25, 2017), https://armen-
press.am/eng/news/917344/%E2%80%98frozen-conflict-or-a-war-in-bain-ma-
rie%E2%80%99³-diario-de-noticias-publishes-article-on-nk-conflict.html
(“¶Our main enemies are all Armenians in the world,’ said, in 2012, Ilham Ali-
yev, president of Azerbaijan since 2003, when he succeeded his father. ¶Arme-
nia, as a country, has no value at all. It is a colony, a territory artificially cre-
ated in Azerbaijan’s lands. . . .’”).
173. MIKHELIDZE&PIROZZI, supra note 5, at 16.
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minder for Azerbaijan of what it has lost. The unresolved con-
flict
174
negatively affects cross-boundary relationships among
multiple generations of Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
175
Arme-
nia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian, brought the deep-seated
distrust and bitterness between the two countries to the fore
during his address of the seventy-third United Nations General
Assembly in New York.
176
Mr. Pashinian shamed Azerbaijan for
its “disrespect towards the [OSCE Minsk] negotiations,” and
then warned that “Karabakh must not be a part of Azerbaijan,
unless one wants to trigger a new genocide of Armenian peo-
ple.”
177
IV. REFORMULATING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OFOCCUPATION
TO PREVENT ITS CORRUPTION
The corrupt occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh poses an oppor-
tunity for reconsidering the international law of occupation to
prevent this situation from repeating.
178
One possible solution is
174. Id. at 17 (asserting that Nagorno-Karabakh “is one of the world’s most
militarized places.”); see Tamkin, supra note 4 (observing that, far from reso-
lution, “[e]ach side maintains the other started last spring’s fighting” during
the violent military outburst in 2016, violating the Nagorno-Karabakh cease-
fire).
175. Sabine Freizer, Nagorno-Karabakh: ´Putting the Freeze on a Frozen
Conflict,µ INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Dec. 25, 2007), https://www.crisisgroup.org/eu-
rope-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan/nagorno-karabakh-
putting-freeze-frozen-conflict (“Constant state propaganda on both sides keeps
their [Armenia and Azerbaijan’s] publics opposed to any concession, let alone
reconciliation” of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict); De Waal, supra note 11;
Barseghyan & Sultanova, supra note 55; see generally ¶Frozen Conflict or aWar
in Bain-Marie’ ³ Diario de Noticias Publishes Article on NK Conflict, supra
note 172.
176. Karabakh Must Not Be a Part of Azerbaijan, Armenia’s PM Tells UN
General Assembly, MASSISPOST (Sept. 26, 2018),
https://massispost.com/2018/09/karabakh-must-not-be-a-part-of-azerbaijan-
armenias-pm-tells-un-general-assembly/.
177. Id.
178. Scrutiny of the international law of occupation is critical because the
unfortunate effects of the Nagorno-Karabahk occupation are not unique. The
recent occupations of the West Bank and Gaza, and Western Sahara produced
similar results. See GROSS, supra note 125, at 123 (positing that prolonged oc-
cupations, including the one in Nagorno-Karabakh, “attest that indeterminacy
about the status of a territory as occupied is typical of many if not most occu-
pations, at least after World War II. The debates . . . which brought the inde-
terminacy of occupation to the forefront, is thus a continuation of, rather than
an exception to the rule.”); see generally MIKHELIDZE& PIROZZI, supra note 5.
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to reformulate Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
179
to
consider an occupier’s intent and require an occupier to abide by
the complete list of humanitarian duties for protecting the occu-
pied people.
A. Adding an Occupier-Intent Element and Expanding Human-
itarian Responsibilities in Article 6
First, the Fourth Geneva Convention is an ideal medium to
implement changes to occupation law because of its widespread
acceptance and primacy in defining the international law of oc-
cupation.
180
Second, Article 6 would be an appropriate vehicle for
applying an intent element and broadening an occupier’s duties,
as it currently suggests that occupation is a temporary situation
in a post-conflict State,
181
and limits how the Convention applies
to the occupier.
182
A reformulation may state (author’s revision
in italics):
179. Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states:
The present Convention shall apply from the outset of any
conflict or occupation mentioned in Article 2. In the territory
of Parties to the conflict, the application of the present Con-
vention shall cease on the general close of military opera-
tions. In the case of occupied territory, the application of the
present Convention shall cease one year after the general
close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power
shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the ex-
tent that such Power exercises the functions of government
in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of
the present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52
53, 59, 61 to 77, 143.
Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 6.
180. See supra Part II.
181. Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention addresses the temporality of
occupation. Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 6. See also Ben-Naftali et
al., supra note 74, at 594 (“Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relates
most directly to the temporal limits of occupation and thus merits special at-
tention.”).
182. Reading the treaty’s plain text, the Fourth Geneva Convention states
that only the Articles referred to in Article 6³1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51,
52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, and 143³remain in force during an occupation. Geneva
Convention, supra note 9, art. 6; see also Legal Consequences of the Construc-
tion of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 125 (July 9), https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/131/advisory-
opinions (according to the International Court of Justice, “provisions applying
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In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present
Convention shall cease one year after the general close of mili-
tary operations, unless it is the intent of the Occupying Power
to continue the occupation, in which case all the provisions of
the following Articles of the present Convention apply to said
Occupying Power.
Therefore, if it is an occupier’s intent to continue occupying a
territory post-military conflict, the occupied people would be en-
titled to the complete humanitarian protections listed under the
Fourth Geneva Convention. If the occupier does not intend to
continue occupation, then it would no longer be held to all of the
provisions one year after the conflict.
1. Determining Occupier Intent
Determining an occupier’s intent would depend on several fac-
tors, including the duration of the occupation, whether the occu-
pier has a reasonable plan to cede control, the occupier’s objec-
tives for the occupation, the occupied people’s welfare, and the
presence of the occupier.
183
The occupier-presence factor would
subsume the Chiragov “boots on the ground” rule, considering
the occupier’s physical presence as having some weight, but not
determinative of an occupier’s intent.
184
during military operations leading to the occupation and those that remain
applicable throughout the entire period of occupation” differ) (citing Article 6
of the Geneva Convention). But see Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 74, at 595
(The Court’s “textual interpretation, leading to the conclusion that long-term
occupations reduce the responsibilities of occupying powers vis-à-vis the occu-
pied civilian population, is an absurd conclusion.”).
183. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list; it merely reflects the factors
that have appeared as considerations in judicial determinations of occupation,
see Chiragov v. Armenia, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 135 (2015), and that prioritize
humanitarian concerns, see Cohen, supra note 78, at 502 (describing a human-
itarian theory of occupation’s development).
184. As the European Court of Human Rights ultimately determined in Chi-
ragov, an occupier does not need to be physically present to exert a presence³
meaning control³over the occupied territory. See Chiragov, 2015-III Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 216; cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 110 (June 27),
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/70/070-19860627-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf
(finding that although the United States’ provision of “heavy subsidies and
other support” to a rebel group did not overcome its independence, sufficient
evidence of aid could establish a relationship of complete dependence, and
therefore, legal responsibility). Illegal resettlement by the occupier could also
2018]Armenia and Azerbaijan's Struggle with Occupation 481
If an occupier intends to continue an occupation, subject to the
Fourth Geneva Convention, the occupier would have two legal
options:
185
(1) cede control by agreement; or (2) continue the oc-
cupation and be responsible for all the rights and duties enumer-
ated in the Fourth Geneva Convention and its Protocols.
2. Increasing Humanitarian Protections for the Occupied Peo-
ple
The occupier-intent element would provide the occupied people
with as much humanitarian support as possible by applying all
of the Fourth Geneva Convention provisions³not just articles 1
to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, and 143³for
as long as the occupation continues.
186
This comprehensive ap-
plication is critical to ensuring humanitarian protection as “[t]he
specific prohibitions in articles 27²34 and 47²78 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention overwhelmingly involve the protection of in-
dividual rights. Collectively, these provisions have been de-
scribed as a ¶bill of rights for the occupied population.’”
187
The
additional protections for the occupied people would include es-
tablishing protected “hospital and safety zones” that are orga-
nized, supplied and run by either a State or humanitarian or-
ganization,
188
prioritizing the protection of the most vulnerable
individuals in the occupied state,
189
and perhaps most critically,
be considered a means of asserting control. See Legal Consequences of the Con-
struction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 182, ¶¶
119, 139 (recognizing Israel’s effective control of the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory partly through its mechanism of forced resettlement).
185. No doubt an occupier could still opt to defy the Convention and forge an
illegal path. However, the clarity of who is an occupier and the full-scale re-
sponsibilities, plus increased third-party involvement in humanitarian aid,
would potentially apply additional pressure on an occupier comply with the
treaty laws.
186. Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 6. Professor Gross shares the view
“that people living under occupation should be entitled to the full scope of
rights enumerated in international law.” GROSS, supra note 125, at 395; see
also STIRK, supra note 125, at 43 (noting that “prolonged occupation would re-
quire the occupying power to pay more attention to the needs of the inhabit-
ants. . . .”).
187. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, supra note 96, at 270 (citation omitted).
188. Geneva Convention, supra note 9, arts. 14²15, 20²23.
189. Id. art. 16 (“The wounded and sick, as well as the infirm, and expectant
mothers, shall be the object of particular protection and respect” as well as
providing protection for “other persons exposed to grave danger”).
482 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:1
that these protections will not be implemented in a discrimina-
tory fashion.
190
Theoretically, distributing comprehensive aid non-discrimi-
nately may create a safer and more stable environment; there-
fore, occupied people would be less likely to leave their homes.
191
Preventing displacement would avoid the many legal and socie-
tal problems that otherwise accompany forcing people from their
homes, including violations of property rights and creating refu-
gees.
192
Also, maintaining the occupied population will avoid cre-
ating a population vacuum that can be easily filled with the oc-
cupier’s citizens.
193
Additionally, the benign presence of interna-
tional humanitarian support, such as from the International
Committee of the Red Cross and other organizations,
194
could act
as a neutral monitor and reporter on the status of the occupied
people. Finally, stabilizing the occupied state’s original de-
190. Id. art. 13 (requiring that humanitarian protections be offered to the
entire occupied population “without any adverse distinction based, in particu-
lar, on race, nationality, religion or political opinion”).
191. Creating an unsafe environment and withholding aid in a discrimina-
tory fashion appears to have the opposite effect. See Chiragov v. Armenia,
2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 224²25 (2015) (noting the refugee applicants’ argument
that “the military action, and the widespread ethnic hostilities which preceded
it, led to large-scale ethnic expulsion and the creation of mono ethnic areas
which resemble the terrible concept of ethnic cleansing” in the Lachin area
adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, preventing them from returning to their
homes).
192. Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, supra note 12, at 6.
193. See SHENHAV, supra note 168, at 59²60; compare Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note
182, ¶¶ 119²20 (“The Court concludes that the Israeli settlements in the Occu-
pied Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem) have been established
in breach of international law,” citing Article 49 of the Geneva Convention),
with DE WAAL, supra note 14, at 49 (describing the story of one Azerbaijani
man whose former home in Shusha, the pre-Soviet capital of Nagorno-
Karabakh, was found inhabited by an Armenian woman and her daughter, af-
ter the “Karabakh Armenian authorities . . . encourage[ed] people who had lost
their homes to move up to Shusha. . . .”).
194. Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 59 (“If the whole or part of the
population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying
Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population. . . .
which may be undertaken either by States or by impartial humanitarian or-
ganizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, shall con-
sist, in particular, of the provision of consignments of foodstuffs, medical sup-
plies and clothing.”).
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mographics would guarantee a more legitimate referendum re-
flective of the inhabitants, if that becomes part of resolving the
occupation.
195
3. Encouraging an Occupier to Cede Control
The intent element places an occupier on notice that it is ex-
pected to either relinquish control, or plan for providing com-
plete humanitarian protection to the occupied people. The addi-
tional humanitarian requirements, along with the potential in-
creased international scrutiny from third-party organizations,
could deter an occupier frommaintaining control for an extended
period.
Because of the added humanitarian responsibilities under the
Fourth Geneva Convention, ensuring necessities for the occu-
pied population, as well as the underlying systems for delivering
those necessities³such as hospitals and roadways³would in-
crease the occupier’s financial and resource burdens.
196
Ulti-
mately, an occupier may be forced to reconsider its priority of
maintaining the occupation based on the sheer cost or the polit-
ical backlash from diverging domestic resources to a foreign re-
gion.
With the increased resources required to protect the occupied
people, an occupier may also be more likely to seek third-party
aid to help alleviate the burden.
197
Greater involvement from hu-
manitarian organizations could also pressure the occupier to ul-
timately cede control, without harming the occupied population
through violence or sanctions. Third-party organizations could
also help boost the occupation into the international community
spotlight. Therefore, humanitarian organizations may not be the
only ones who call for resolution of an occupation; broadcasting
their work and the current situation could also prompt a global
response.
195. See Catriona Drew, The East Timor Story: International Law on Trial,
12 E.J.I.L. 651, 662 n. 59 (2001) (noting that recent examples of states declar-
ing independence through self-determination “favours the referendum as a
means of ascertaining the free will of the people.”).
196. See generally Geneva Convention, supra note 9.
197. See Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 5 (requiring parties to a conflict to
assign a “Protecting Power,” which could be “the International Committee of
the Red Cross or . . . any other organization which offers all guarantees of im-
partiality and efficacy” to apply the protections in the Geneva Convention).
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Thus, applying an occupier-intent analysis and expanding an
occupier’s humanitarian responsibilities would help fulfill occu-
pation’s dual purposes of maintaining state sovereignty and pro-
tecting the civilian welfare.
198
4. Risking Enabling a Prolonged Occupation
A potential negative side-effect of requiring an occupier to pro-
vide the full amount of humanitarian aid to an occupied people
would be that it enables the prolongation of an occupation. An
occupier may be able to spend its resources on military and de-
fense while humanitarian organizations protect the people.
199
Furthermore, an occupied people may not demand an end to an
occupation as vociferously if they feel safe
200
and have access to
necessities, such as food
201
and medical care.
202
Moreover, the
occupier-intent element does not mandate an end to an occupa-
tion
203
; therefore, the international community would still be re-
sponsible in helping to resolve the occupation.
V. APPLYING THE REFORMULATED ARTICLE 6 TONAGORNO-
KARABAKH
Applying the occupier-intent element to the occupation of Na-
gorno-Karabakh, Armenia intended to continue its occupation,
and thus should be subject to the full set of humanitarian duties
under the Fourth Geneva Convention and its Protocols.
First, the amount of time that the occupation has continued
would depend on when the inquiry was posed after the general
close of military operations with the 1994 ceasefire.
204
However,
with the benefit of hindsight, the now decades-old occupation
205
would weigh in favor of Armenia intending its continuation. Sec-
ond, Armenia’s plan was to maintain control over the region,
198. See supra Part II.B.
199. Additional Protocol I prohibits an occupier from diverting resources in-
tended for humanitarian assistance “if such diversion or requisition would be
harmful to the civilian population.” Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 63.
200. Geneva Convention, supra note 9, arts. 14²15.
201. Id. arts. 23, 36, 50, 55, 59.
202. Id. arts. 50, 55, 59.
203. Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 74, at 613 (calling for “the international
community to promulgate clear time limitations for the duration of an occupa-
tion” and detailing some possibilities for how to do so).
204. Nagorno-Karabakh Profile, supra note 1.
205. Kontorovich, supra note 5; MIKHELIDZE&PIROZZI, supra note 5, at 16.
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even if from afar.
206
Third, although the occupation began with
Armenia supporting a referendum organized by the Nagorno-
Karabakh oblast’s government,
207
it has remained firmly in-
volved in Nagorno-Karabakh and its government through mili-
tary, financial, and political support.
208
More recently, Armenian
officials have stated that the occupation’s objectives include that
Nagorno-Karabakh not return to Azerbaijan.
209
Fourth, the oc-
cupied people live in uncertain conditions, often threatened with
military attacks.
210
Finally, while there are conflicting reports
about whether Armenian troops are present in Nagorno-
Karabakh,
211
Armenia does provide military resources.
212
All
five factors weigh in favor of Armenia’s intent to continue occu-
pying Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore, it should provide the com-
plete humanitarian protections under the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention and its Protocols to the occupied people.
Envisaging that Armenia would have provided this compre-
hensive humanitarian assistance since the beginning of the oc-
cupation, it may have saved many of the original Nagorno-
Karabakh residents from displacement or harm. Also, creating
safe zones and providing essential resources
213
likely would have
prevented the creation of a militarized buffer zone.
214
Ensuring
a secure, livable environment for all the residents³Armenian,
206. Chiragov v. Armenia, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 216 (2015).
207. Nagorno-Karabakh Profile, supra note 1.
208. Chiragov, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 216.
209. Siranush Ghazanchyan, No Alternative to Karabakh Being Outside
Azerbaijan ³ Armenia’s President, ARM. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 16, 2017),
http://www.armradio.am/en/2017/10/16/no-alternative-to-karabakh-being-out-
side-azerbaijan-armenias-president/ (following a meeting with Azerbaijan’s
president, organized by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs on October 16, 2017,
in Geneva, Switzerland, Armenia’s president announced that any solution
would require the Nagorno-Karabakh region to be outside of Azerbaijan terri-
tory); Karabakh Must Not Be a Part of Azerbaijan, Armenia’s PM Tells UN
General Assembly, supra note 176 (recounting that less than a year later, Ar-
menia’s prime minister darkly forewarned that there would be another Arme-
nian genocide if Nagorno-Karabakh became part of Azerbaijan).
210. Nagorno-Karabakh Truce Holds, but Residents Fear Renewed Violence,
supra note 17.
211. Chiragov, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 212.
212. Id. at 216.
213. Geneva Convention, supra note 9, arts. 14²15, 20²23.
214. See supra Part I.
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Azerbaijani and others³would have been challenging,
215
but the
assistance of humanitarian organizations could have aided in
protection and peace-keeping. Furthermore, the presence of in-
ternational humanitarian organizations could have provided
neutral monitoring and reporting of the occupation. Currently,
the OSCE has taken on this role; however, it is a limited effort.
216
Maintaining the region’s population demographics and avoiding
the inter-ethnic violence and harmful displacement may have
helped facilitate a long-term resolution to the occupation.
Although providing additional humanitarian assistance to the
Nagorno-Karabakh population may have further enabled Arme-
nia’s occupation, this criticism rings hollow when comparing this
hypothetical with the current prolonged occupation without
comprehensive aid. Instead, it seems that the Nagorno-
Karabakh civilians could have only benefitted from Armenia’s
obligation to provide the complete humanitarian protections un-
der the international law of occupation.
CONCLUSION
The corrupt occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and its sur-
rounding areas results in displaced civilians, chaotic military vi-
olence, poor judicial law-making, and hostile international rela-
tions.
217
Analyzing the international law of occupation’s pur-
poses and its humanitarian requirements illustrates that there
is a need for change.
218
Reformulating the international law of
occupation by revising Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tions with an occupier-intent element and expanding an occu-
pier’s responsibilities to encompass all the provisions of the
Fourth Geneva Convention could prevent another similar cor-
rupt occupation.
219
Not only would the reformulation expand and
215. See Chiragov, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 220 (acknowledging that alt-
hough the Armenian “Government has had to provide assistance to hundreds
of thousands of Armenian refugees and internally displaced persons . . . re-
quir[ing] considerable resources, the protection of this group does not exempt
the Government from its obligations towards another group, namely Azerbai-
jani citizens like the applicants who had to flee during the conflict.”).
216. Currently, the OSCE monitors the border with Azerbaijan based on a
pre-scheduled agreement with the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. OSCE Con-
ducts Monitoring of the Artsakh-Azerbaijan Line of Contact, ARM. PUB. RADIO
(Nov. 14, 2018), http://www.armradio.am/en/840.
217. See supra Part III.
218. See supra Part II.
219. See supra Part IV.
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emphasize an occupier’s duty to provide humanitarian protec-
tions to the occupied people, but also potentially increase inter-
national involvement to resolve an occupation.
220
In the case of
Nagorno-Karabakh, both are sorely needed.
Carolyn Morway
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